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This paper studies the politico-economic reasons for the refusal of a proposed compulsory 
flood insurance scheme in Germany. It provides the rationale for such scheme and outlines 
the basic features of a market-orientated design. The main reasons for the political down-turn 
of this proposal were the misperceived costs of a state guarantee, legal objections against a 
compulsory insurance, distributional conflicts between the federal government and the Ger-
man states (Länder) on the implied administrative costs, and the well-known charity hazard of 
ad-hoc disaster relief. The focus on pure market solutions proved to be an ineffective strategy 




Dieses Papier untersucht die politisch-ökonomischen Gründe für die Ablehnung einer Versi-
cherungspflicht für Elementarschäden in Deutschland. Nach einer Darlegung der ökonomi-
schen Vorteilhaftigkeit und der Grundzüge eines praktikablen Modells einer Elementarscha-
denversicherungspflicht werden die drei wichtigsten Argumente der Kritiker diskutiert. Dies 
sind zu einem die Notwendigkeit und Höhe einer staatlichen Ausfalldeckung, rechtliche Be-
denken gegen eine Beschränkung der Konsumentensouveränität und Verteilungskonflikte 
zwischen Bund und Ländern auf der Grundlage unterschiedlicher Gefahrenexposition sowie 
die politisch-ökonomische Rationalität von Soforthilfemaßnahmen. Die ökonomische Forde-
rung nach einer reinen Marktlösung erwies sich in den Verhandlungen als ein Nirwana-
Ansatz. 
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1 Introduction 
1 Introduction 
This paper examines the political and economic reasons for the rejection of a proposal to 
introduce mandatory natural disaster insurance in Germany. A high-level committee of ex-
perts was assembled by the Conference of German Finance Ministers (FMK) to discuss this 
proposal1, but after lengthy debate, the idea was ultimately rejected. In the following, we 
present the economic arguments in favour of this kind of mandatory scheme, explain the basic 
features of a market-orientated approach, and discuss the counter-arguments and political 
motives of its critics. The main point of criticism was that the proposal implies a state guaran-
tee covering large claims. Furthermore, critics of the scheme have raised questions about the 
legality of placing limitations on the consumers’ right to choose, concerns about potential 
distributional conflicts between Germany’s federal and state governments. Last but not least 
the overall political rationale behind the present system of emergency aid was a strong argu-
ment in favour of the status quo. After discussing these issues, the present paper concludes by 
highlighting the merits and drawbacks of a “pure” market solution for coping with natural 
hazards. The main lesson to be learned from the German debate and our analysis is that a 
focus on pure market solutions has proven to be an overly simplistic and ineffective strategy 
for policy-advice in this field. 
Extreme floods have become frequent events in Germany. The past decade alone has wit-
nessed four “floods of the century”, which statistically occur only once every 200 to 300 
years.  In 1997, Germany and Poland suffered catastrophic flooding along the river Oder, 
followed in 2002 by the largest-ever recorded flood of the Elbe (notably in Dresden, cf. 
Schwarze/Wagner 2004) and a series of medium and large floods in 2005 and 2006 in the 
alpine regions of the south. As a consequence, proposals for mandatory insurance against 
floods and other natural disasters have been proposed by various parties.2  The authors of this 
paper made an early contribution to the discussion with a concrete proposal 
                                                                          
1 The German Conference of Finance Ministers (FMK) is made up of the Federal Minister of Finance and 16 State 
Ministers of Finance (“Länderfinanzminister”). The FMK is regularly holding so-called “high level conferences” to 
discuss issues of mutual interest in the preparation for legislative proposals to the Conference of the Federal 
Heads of State (“Länderministerkonferenz”, LMK). Before the FMK decides upon an issue, it is not unusual that a 
working group consisting of staff specialists of the Ministeries of Finance and invited experts, including academics 
and lobbyists, holds discussions to lay the foundations for the decision-making within the FMK. 
2 Supporters of this idea can be found in all political parties, ranging from the left-wing PDS (Roland Claus) to the 
center-right CSU (Edmund Stoiber). 
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(Schwarze/Wagner 2002, 2003), which was then taken up by the FMK working group in June 
2003 to discuss the various concepts and to seek ways of implementing a mandatory insur-
ance scheme. Several meetings were held with insurance experts and political delegates from 
the state Ministries of Justice, but the matter was ultimately dropped, and in February 2004 
the working group ceased to exist. In its final report, it stated that “it is not possible to find an 
appropriate means of giving people legally binding protection against the risk of natural disas-
ters, while relieving public budgets of the financial burden”. 
While this process was underway, the German Federal Ministry for the Environment drafted a 
bill on flood protection that was passed by the Federal Parliament in 2004.3  It basically for-
bids building and commercial usage of land liable to flood; in other words, it imposes a ban of 
economic activity in these areas. But banning land use is not always the appropriate response 
to an increase in extreme weather events due to climate change. In a densely populated coun-
try like Germany, large areas of land cannot be simply withdrawn from the economy in re-
sponse to increasing risks of floods and other natural disasters. Such a policy would not only 
be counter to people’s needs, it would also be far too expensive in terms of opportunity costs.  
More than 16% of the land along rivers in Germany is already under intensive economic us-
age, and the percentage of buildings being built near rivers is rising faster than those being 
built outside inundation zones, mainly because sites near rivers are generally regarded as 
more attractive.  In principle, there can be no objections to this trend as long as the “costs of 
enjoying a river view” are not borne by the general public (after cases of extreme flooding). 
Mandatory insurance would be one way to assure that anyone who wants to live near the Elbe 
or at the foothills of the Alps bears the financial consequences of the inherently higher risk. 
                                                                          
3 Act to Improve Protection against Flooding of 3.5.2005, BGBl. Part 1, No. 26, pp. 1224-1228    
(www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/pdf/hochwasserschutzgesetz.pdf). 
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2  The Disaster Syndrome: A Worldwide Problem  
Considering Germany’s experience to date with voluntary supplementary disaster insurance4  
as well as the experiences of other countries5, we clearly see that a sufficient degree of insur-
ance coverage against natural disasters can only be provided through some form of state in-
tervention. With the exception of insurance against storm and hail damage, the “free market” 
only provides coverage for a small percentage of major natural disasters – between five and 
ten per cent.6 This is due to distorted demand and insufficient supply, factors that are fatally 
interconnected and mutually escalate each other’s effects. So we agree with Kunreuther7 in 
describing this as a “disaster syndrome” (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: The Disaster Syndrome and Insurance 
Nachfrage   È 
Angebot   È 
Kosten   Ç  Preis   Ç  Staatliche  
Soforthilfe   Ç  Sch  ä  den   Ç 
Öffentliche und 
private Prävention   È 
Demand È 
Supply È 
Costs Ç  Price Ç  State emer-  
gency aid   Ç  Damage Ç 
Public and 
private prevention È 
 
 
Much has been written about the reasons for the lack of demand for disaster insurance.8  The 
main reasons given for demand-side market failure are: 
                                                                          
4 Citlak/Wagner (2001), Schwarze/Wagner (2002). 
5 Ungern-Sternberg (2001, 2002), Prettenthaler/Vetters (2004). 
6 There are striking regional differences in Germany.  The state of Baden-Wurttemberg, for example, has almost 
full cover (90% insurance density) for damage to buildings from natural disasters, as a result of the mandatory 
insurance required up to 2003. The eastern German states also have a high density of cover (approx. . 50%), as 
household policies were carried over from GDR times. 
7 Kunreuther (2000), p. 301. 
8 Cf. Kunreuther (1976 and 1996), Coate (1995), Noll (1996), Epstein (1996), Endres et al. (2003), 
Schwarze/Wagner (2004). 
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•  Systematic underestimation and high discounting of the full extent of the risk of rare disas-
ters by those people likely to be affected 
•  The availability of aid from the state and private charities when damage is incurred (the so-
called “charity hazard”)9. 
The underestimation of rare natural disasters (low-probability, high-risk events) is well docu-
mented in the literature on risk psychology.10  Surveys of people living in areas at risk of 
earthquakes and floods have repeatedly shown that individuals systematically underestimate 
the likelihood of such events.11 Events thought to lie in the distant future are strongly dis-
counted and no technical or financial provisions are made.12  
An additional problem on the demand side is the split responsibility for the construction and 
ownership of property in risk-prone areas. Municipalities, developers, and clients are not 
interested in insuring against rare and extreme events, for this could frighten off potential 
buyers and depress the price of the property. The same applies to those selling the property. 
Thus, anyone not planning to keep their property for generations will find it advantageous to 
view the risk of natural disasters as negligible and portray it as such.13
The lack of demand leads to problems on the supply side. Like any insurance, natural disaster 
insurance is a business with economies of scale.  It is only possible for the insurers to “elimi-
nate risk” (Sinn 1995) by piling up large stocks of statistically unrelated risks. Often risks of 
the same type are grouped into one pool. To make the law of probability work (which is the 
basis for the concept of insurance), these stocks must be of sufficient size.14 The smaller the 
pool, the more difficult it is to insure against risks. Thus, the smaller the pool, the higher the 
premiums calculated by insurance companies. Consequently, the few insurance policies avail-
                                                                          
9  Browne/Hoyt (2000, p. 293) define “charity hazard” as the tendency of individuals not to insure themselves 
against possible natural disasters because they believe help will be available, e.g. from friends, family, the mu-
nicipality, charities or state emergency programs.  
10  Tversky/Kahneman (1973) provide a thorough account of this. 
11  Cf. e.g. Palm et al. (1990); case studies showing similar results for Germany are Pfeil (2000) and Plapp 
(2004). 
12  See Kunreuther et al. (1998) specifically on the intertemporal underestimation of disaster risk. 
13  For this reason, since 1998, California has made it obligatory for vendors of property and estate agents to 
disclose any disaster risk (Residential Disclosure Law, California Civil Code, Section 1102).  In Germany the 
private vendors of property are obligated by law to inform the potential purchaser of any known faults, e.g. dry rot, 
but not dangers like floods or backwater (verdict by the Federal High Court of 7.2.2003 - VZR 25/02, in: GE 2003, 
p. 518). 
14  Insurance against individual events is also possible; economically, however  this is a gamble and not the core 
business of insurance providers.  
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able in Germany against natural disasters are more expensive than they would be if there were 
numerous buyers on the market. If the pool shrinks, there is also always an initial suspicion of 
adverse selection: it is frequently the good risks that leave the pool while the bad remain, 
increasing the expected damage occurring in the pool of insureds. 
Both these factors together, and each one independently, drive up the costs and the price of 
insurance. But the rising price depresses demand. So any reduction in demand (whatever its 
cause) has a multiplier effect, depressing further demand. 
These problems are inherent in the market, but there is also a fundamental policy failure. 
Obvious under-insurance provides the political legitimation for a policy of emergency aid. 
Private donations and state reconstruction programs are intended to help the victims to bear 
uninsured risks. But this makes the “the policy of aid” self-perpetuating, for by guaranteeing 
support it dampens the demand for insurance and thus reduces the number of insurance poli-
cies sold.15
A policy of state emergency aid not only dampens the demand for insurance, it also reduces 
the incentive to make provisions for self-protection, and reduces the pressure on local policy-
makers to take public protection measures. These latter two factors increase the expected level 
of damage and thus also the costs of insurance, giving rise to a further wave of rising prices 
and falling demand. 
This “Disaster Syndrome” can only be cured either by the radical remedy of refusing to grant 
state aid16 or by making insurance mandatory. Refusing to grant state aid would not only be 
counter to the principle of the welfare state in Germany, it would almost certainly fail politi-
cally. As long as a policy of state emergency aid helps politicians win elections (as in the 
summer of 2002) emergency aid programs will continue to thrive. This is almost universally 
true. Thus, the only pragmatic solution for overcoming the “Disaster Syndrome” is mandatory 
natural disaster insurance. 
                                                                          
15  For the basic theory, see Coate (1995) and for an empirical discussion, Browne/Hoyt (2000). 
16  This is proposed by Epstein, for example (1996). 
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3  The Response of German Insurers to the “Flood of the 
Century” in 2002: 
Increasing Premiums and Withdrawal of Coverage 
The German flood disaster of 2002 was the single most expensive flood in German history 
(see Table 1). Economic losses from the floods were estimated at €11.6 billion. Allianz Insur-
ance Group was hit particularly hard by the summer floods. It faced losses of almost €800 
million because the home insurance policies that it had taken over in eastern Germany during 
the reunification process provided blanket coverage for flood damage. 
Table 1: Flood Damage in Germany 
 




3/1981 Germany  46  - 
1981 Southern  Germany  40  5 
1983 Rhine  27  2 
1984 Rhine  72  3 
1988 Danube  27  4 
12/1993 Rhine  540  162 
8/1991 Danube  50  4 
4/1994 Elbe  162  54 
1/1995 Rhine  288  117 
7/1997 Oder  324  32 
11/1998 Germany  135  5 
5/1999 Rhine  72  5 
5/1999 Danube  375  63 
6/2002 Western  Bavaria  100  50 
8/2002 Elbe  11600  1740 
8/2005 Bavaria  220  50 
 
Sources: Presseforum der Schaden- und Unfallversicherer 14.-15.5.2001, Düsseldorf (www.gdv.de); Data for 
6/2002, 8/2002 and 8/2005 by Munich Re (/www.munichre.com). 
 
Mindful of the rising exposure to risk, German insurers are currently adopting a more cau-
tious stance, reducing coverage in high-risk areas and increasing premiums and deductibles. 
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Previously, the calculation of premiums was based on maximum flood-related losses of €2.5 
billion and an observation period of 100 years. Now the basis of calculation is a total of €11 
to €15 billion and an observation period of 200 to 300 years.17 Premiums increased in high-
risk regions of Saxony up to 60 per cent. 
Table 2: Adjusted Probable Maximum Losses for Natural Disasters (in bn. €) 
Return Period  200 years  300 years 
Flooding  7.5 – 10   9 - 12  
Earth Quake  6.5 – 9   9 - 12  
Storm  7 - 9   9 - 12  
Storm tide  10 – 20 
Source: Allianz (cf. Olaf Bogenrieder 2005) 
 
Heavy rainfall and aging dikes have been added as risk factors that could justify denial of 
coverage in individual cases. Compared to the situation prior to the flood of 2002, this means 
that insurance companies now refuse to cover property that was previously considered “un-
problematic.” The German Insurance Association (GDV) estimates that if these risk factors 
are included, the share of uninsurable regions would increase from 10% today to between 20 
and 25% (see figure 2a and 2b). 
                                                                          
17 The longer the period of observation, the higher the potential maximum damage that can be caused by an 
event. By basing PMLs on a 200-year return period, the German insurance market is adopting procedures that 
have long been common practice in the international reinsurance industry. 
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4 A Proposed Market-Oriented Mandatory Insurance against Natural Disasters 
 











Blue: Flooded area in Dresden 2002 (flood frequency: ff = 1/200; previously fully insurable) 
Dark red: Old Zone 3 (= ff  > 1/10; uninsurable)       Dark red: New Zone 4 (= ff > 1/10; uninsurable) 
Light red: Old Zone 2 (= ff > 1/50, partially insurable)    Light red: New Zone 3 (= ff > 1/200, partially insurable) 
4  A Proposed Market-Oriented Mandatory Insurance against 
Natural Disasters  
Immediately after the 2002 flood, economists proposed a general mandatory insurance against 
natural catastrophes that would solve most of these problems. The mandatory natural hazard 
insurance that economists and the insurance industry favoured would be based on two princi-
ples: 
•  First, all basic natural disasters (wind storms, floods, earthquakes, etc.) would be covered 
by a single insurance policy. This pooling approach would increase the efficiency of risk 
coverage; moreover, the group of those potentially at risk would be as broad as possible.  
•  Second, in the case of floods, only 'once-in-a-century' damages would be insured. This 
means that practically all floods in non-risk areas would be covered, but that 'regular 
floods' in high-risk areas would not. In cases of catastrophic losses, the state would step 
in as the insurer of last resort. State intervention, however, would be strictly limited to 
covering 'mega-losses.'  
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High risk-based deductibles would apply in extremely risk-exposed areas that are regularly hit 
by floods (risk zone 4, ff > 1/10), so that the insurance would cover only rare, large-scale 
events. At the same time, an obligation to insure would mean that all households could get at 
least this cover.  
To foster loss prevention, premiums should depend on the extent to which individuals have 
taken preventative measures. For private buildings, for example, deductibles could rise in 
accordance with the exposure to risk. Failure to put provisions in place would, thus, be penal-
ised more harshly in regions where natural catastrophes are frequent than in regions where 
they are rare.   
The industrial sector already has substantial experience with differentiated, risk-based premi-
ums for industrial fire and environmental liability insurance (Schwarze 2002); therefore, vol-
untary insurance seems sufficient in this case. 
This market-oriented system of mandatory natural hazard insurance is summarised graphi-
cally in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Market-Oriented Mandatory Insurance against Natural Disasters (Flood 
Module) 
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State participation is needed in such a system. It would, however, have be strictly limited to 
covering ‘mega-damage’ (€8 –30 billion in the case of flooding). The insurance industry 
would not only act as a primary insurer but also provide reinsurance in the form of a pool with 
obligatory membership for all companies. Only when the primary insurance and reinsurance 
capacities are exceeded would the state provide additional capacity to cover the deficit. 
Such insurance would make it possible to calculate how much compensation the insured per-
son/company can expect, allow insurers to calculate their loss exposure and, at the same time, 
strictly limit government intervention. It would also serve as an incentive for loss reduction, 
because individuals could reduce their premiums by implementing preventive measures and 
because the cost of premiums in high-risk areas would increase political pressure for collec-
tive action.  
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5  Reasons for the Failure to Introduce Mandatory Disaster 
Insurance in Germany  
In Germany the central government has one finance minister, and each of the 16 federal states 
have one as well. All of the finance ministers meet to discuss important issues at the Finance 
Ministers Conference (FMK). The reasons why the negotiations at the 2003/2004 FMK con-
ference did not result in mandatory disaster insurance will be explained in this section. In 
particular, we will show that the problems leading to the downfall of the proposal to introduce 
mandatory disaster insurance: 
•  Failure to recognise the role of state guarantees in enabling private insurance  
•  Mistaken legal objections against mandatory insurance 
•  Distributional conflicts between central and state governments 
•  Re-election considerations by politicians. 
 
a.  Failure to recognise the role of a state guarantee 
The main reason given by the German finance ministers for deciding against mandatory in-
surance for natural disasters is the level of the state guarantee demanded by the German insur-
ance companies. The German Insurance Association (GDV) argued in the finance ministry 
working group that they could only obtain coverage on the worldwide re-insurance market for 
damage amounting to €8 billion a year. With maximum damage expectations of €30 billion 
annually18, the state would have to provide a guarantee against losses of €22 billion. The 
finance ministers did not see any way to fit these sums into their limited budgets. 
But the argument is neither logical nor convincing. The question is not whether the state 
would or would not incur costs of up to €22 billion to cover the insurers’ losses in the event of 
a natural disaster, but whether the state would be called upon to provide aid beginning with 
the first euro or only above and beyond €8 billion in private insurance. Thus the refusal to 
grant a guarantee against loss on excess claims means rejecting the first layer of private cov-
                                                                          
18 This maximum level of damage was a (never fully explained) figure presented by the German Insurance Asso-
ciation in FMK working group negotiations. It was based on two different damage scenarios (according to GDV 
representatives). One is a series of two extreme events (recurring every 200 to 300 years); the other is a single 
“millenium event” (recurring every 1000 years). The “millenium flood event” was put at around 25 billion euros, 
while the “millenium storm event” was said to cause damage of up to 26 billion euros. Damage figures include 
losses to private and commercial buildings but not losses to public infrastructure. 
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erage. This rejection is only cheaper for the finance ministers if they discount the aid they will 
have to provide for future disasters, or if they expect that the damage from future catastrophes 
will be carried by the victims to a greater extent than is currently the case—or even carried by 
them entirely.19
 
b.  Exaggerated legal reservations 
The main legal argument put forward against natural disaster insurance was that it would be 
constitutionally impermissible as an excessive state intervention into the general freedom of 
action. Mandatory insurance would indeed constitute a serious infringement on individual 
autonomy, which is only permissible under the German Constitution if 
1. it is in the public interest, 
2. the intervention is appropriate and proportionate, that is, there is no “gentler way” to 
achieve the objective. 
Ad 1: Avoiding the economic strain caused by politically motivated public emergency aid 
programs, in our view, constitutes sufficient public interest to justify general mandatory in-
surance. The legislature decided in favour of mandatory insurance for similar reasons in the 
cases of unemployment and care of the elderly in order to limit the extent to which private 
needs can be passed on as a demand on public coffers (i.e. social assistance). For unemploy-
ment in Germany, a state-organised mandatory insurance scheme was created some 80 years 
ago, long-term care insurance was introduced in the 1990s. Then situations compare to the 
need for protection against natural disasters, once it is recognised that these problems are now 
occurring on a national scale, and that they now affect regions previously immune, as natural 
disasters are become more wide-spread and more extreme as a result of global climate change. 
Ad 2: Judging from experience in other countries and in some German federal states (espe-
cially Baden-Württemberg), a general mandatory insurance scheme is the only suitable way to 
meet this need. A “gentler way” would not be effective. The premium paid by an individual 
for a policy would be affordable and proportionate to risk. According to estimates by the 
Confederation of German Insurers (GDV), comprehensive disaster insurance would cost no 
                                                                          
 
19 There is indeed empirical evidence that politicians and bureaucrats at state agencies systematically discount 
uncertain future events in such a way (e.g., Zimmermann 1988, pp. 205 ff., also Noll 1996). 
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more than €150 a year for a typical single-family home (worth €300,000) in low-risk zones 
with the claimant paying the first €1,500 per claim as a deductible. However, insurance on 
properties in high-risk zones would cost more than €500 a year, with a high deductible of 
€15,000 payable by the claimant. Compared with the premiums of €300 now charged for 
supplementary natural disaster insurance (see Figure 4), this new policy would be a “bear-
able” burden on the individual homeowners. 











































Explanantions: Premium calculations are made for a single-family home insured at an economic value 
of €300,000 with a deductible for flood-related damages at between 1% of the sum insured (Bruderhilfe) 
to 10% of the damage (Gerling). Calculations are based on information provided in Finanztest 5/2004. 
“Fire etc.” summarizes risks related to fire, lightning, leakage from water pipes, and costs related to de-
contamination of soil. Earthquake insurance is only offered by Gerling. Premiums for flood insurance 
provided by Bruderhilfe, a regional insurance company in Saxony, range from €49 to €244 per year de-
pending on the location of the building and previous flood claims (only the lower value is depicted in Fig-
ure 4). 
   
c. Federal conflicts: not just a German problem 
Natural disasters now affect all of Germany, but they affect the different regions to differing 
degrees. The damage from flooding along the Rhine, Mosel and Danube is naturally greater 
than on the Lüneburg Heath or in the Thuringian forests. It is thus unsurprising that past po-
litical efforts to create obligatory flood insurance came from the states of Baden-
Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Bavaria (e.g. Stoiber 1999). But unlike the “flood of 
the century” in 2002, these early initiatives by individual states never made it onto the federal 
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government’s political agenda. The damage caused by the flooding in Dresden and on the 
Upper Elbe was so immense that for the first time it created severe problems for the economy 
as a whole, calling for concerted action by the central and state governments (postponement 
of the so-called “second stage” of tax reform in Germany). Payments of €3.5 billion made by 
the states and municipalities into the reconstruction fund had to be made when their budgets 
were already overstretched.  The resulting situation seemed to be a historical opportunity to 
finally achieve private financial provision on a national scale. 
To achieve this, however, consensus would have been necessary, and this consensus failed to 
materialise out of the discussion over mandatory insurance against natural disasters. Instead 
there were the usual battles over the distribution of funds between federal and state govern-
ment once it became clear that federal government alone could not provide the necessary 
funds for the state guarantee demanded by the insurance industry. There is no easy solution 
for how to distribute the burden of state guarantees between federal and state governments, 
and it was only possible to make a rough estimate of claims that could result from flooding. 
The volume of premiums needed for the intended obligatory insurance of buildings against 
flood risk was put at €1.7 – 3.1 billion per year. Assuming a volume of premiums of €2.85 
billion a year, there would thus be additional federal revenues from insurance tax of €0.46 
billion and a reduction in regional revenue from income and corporate tax of €0.73 billion.20 
The additional tax revenues from the mandatory disaster insurance would thus accrue entirely 
to the federal government (insurance tax), while the states would bear half the reduction in 
income and corporate tax revenues (42.5% and 50% respectively) in addition to the adminis-
trative costs of handling the mandatory insurance. It would have been necessary to solve the 
problem of distributing these gains and losses, and given the major political problems that 
mandatory insurance entailed, this problem finally proved insurmountable. 
 
d.  Public Choice Considerations 
Although the discussion over mandatory disaster insurance was conducted mainly by special-
ists from the ministries, political (election-related) considerations played an important part in 
the decision-making process. The first of these problems was that ad hoc aid gives the deci-
sion-makers greater discretion in their response to natural disasters than regularised benefits. 
                                                                          
20 The effects on value added tax were regarded as insignificant. 
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Second, the fear was expressed that introducing mandatory insurance against natural disasters 
would weaken purchasing power at an already weak point in the economic cycle. 
Much has been speculated about the general political advantage of ad hoc responses to natural 
disasters, but few analyses are available. Crisis situations, it is widely believed, benefit those 
in office and thus damage the opposition, for in crises “people look to their governments”. 
The Elbe floods would appear to substantiate this, for Chancellor Schröder’s energetic and 
sympathetic efforts to help Saxony during the floods led to the governing party’s renewed 
popularity,  helping the Social Democrats to win the 2002 election. In the past, too, other 
leading German politicians have become famous through their actions as crisis managers, and 
were subsequently voted into top office.  One example is Helmut Schmidt, German chancellor 
in the 70s, who gained a national reputation in 1962 during the devastating tidal floods when 
he was Senator to the Interior for the State of Hamburg, and who later became Federal Chan-
cellor. And the present Minister President of Brandenburg, Matthias Platzeck, became known 
through his energetic response to the Oder floods of 1997, when he was Environmental Min-
ister, and thereafter was elected to the supreme state office and a high office in his party.  
The political decision on mandatory disaster insurance, nearly two years after the end of 
broad media coverage of the floods, was determined more by the current economic situation 
and economic policy strategies of the federal government. The estimated withdrawal of €2.85 
billion of purchasing power (the amount estimated for the premiums) was counter to the ef-
forts by the federal government to strengthen purchasing power and stimulate growth, accord-
ing to the final report by the Federal States’ Commission.  
Right as this argument was at the time the decision was taken (2004), it does not take account 
of the fact that a flood also withdraws purchasing power, and that in one specific case in 
2002, it disrupted the government’s tax reduction policy. The rule of the thumb that natural 
disasters are cyclically neutral (the damage equals the reconstruction costs) was not confirmed 
in that specific case. Nor did the Elbe flood bring a corresponding reconstruction stimulus in 
Saxony, as the short-term regional demand impulse in the building industry was outweighed 
by loss of turnover and demand in other sectors. 
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6  Lessons Learned: Intelligent Social Insurance Design is 
better than a Pure Market Solution 
With hindsight, we believe that advising policy-makers to pursue a pure market solution, 
without any cross-subsidisation, was a strategic failure. It has caused two political problems.  
First, there was no credible means of threatening the position of the private insurance indus-
try. Only the threat of introducing a state monopoly would have forced them to provide trans-
parent, feasible estimates of the maximum level of damage that could be covered by private 
insurers. 
Second, with moderate cross-subsidisation it would have been impossible to make the argu-
ment that the insurance premiums were “not bearable”. The figures from the insurance con-
federation on the level of premiums were not convincing to social policy-makers, particularly 
considering the high deductibles in some regions. 
Retrospectively we also find that the requirement of 100% cross-subsidisation free insurance 
premiums is an utopian “nirvana approach”. Any form of subsidisation in flood insurance 
must be judged against the present state practice of ad hoc measures, and not against a refusal 
to grant any state emergency aid, which is completely unrealistic and thus not a meaningful 
point of reference. But with state ad hoc aid provided, cross-subsidisation is, in principle, 
more serious because it is spread among all taxpayers. Moreover, the insurance scheme pro-
vides a much better incentive structure than ad-hoc measures can. 
For the rest, international comparison shows that to a certain extent insurance damage always 
has to be borne by society as a whole. Differentiating premiums according to classes of risk 
(risk zones) does prevent systematic cross-subsidisation, but a remnant of cross-subsidisation 
always remains. We know from the physics of flooding that only a few centimetres difference 
in the water level can have a huge effect on the extent of the flood and its consequences. 
There is no classification system finely graded enough to reflect these differences fully. In 
reality, one also has to accept that flood damage is a community task in populated areas that 
have grown over time and cannot all be left up to the present owners. Thus insurance benefits 
always have to be socialised for a transitional period. A purist approach to economic policy is 
neither sensible nor practical in this context! 
It is also evident, for example, in the United States, where basic insurance coverage for build-
ings and their contents against tidal and river flooding, heavy rainfall, erosion and subsidence 
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is subsidised by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). More than 4.9 million 
households receive an insurance policy against flooding (which they need for their mortgages) 
at a price 60% below the market price. Here, too, the incentive structure is decisive, for the 
subsidy is only given in municipalities that participate in the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram (NFIP). A condition for participating in this program is that the municipality has been 
evaluated as being at risk of flooding,  thus ensuring that all inhabitants are aware of the risk. 
Another condition is that the municipality has taken the prescribed measures to protect against 
flooding. Subsidisation of demand is thus combined here with incentives for the public au-
thorities as well to take preventive measures. The incentives are provided in a way that in-
creases general awareness of the risk. 
Our conclusion is the following. We need intelligently designed social insurance schemes for 
natural catastrophes like those in the US, not “pure” market solutions. We have come to this 
recognition too late in the discussion that followed the 2002 “flood of the century”. It is our 
hope, however, that by documenting this recognition we are contributing to a future policy 
debate on mandatory disaster insurance – one that will inevitably be reopened after the next 
“flood of the century”, which experience has sadly taught us to expect sooner than in a hun-
dred years’ time. 
  17Discussion Paper 620 
References 
References 
Anonymous (2004): Geld nach der Flut, in: Finanztest 5/2004, pp. 74-75. 
Browne, Mark J./ Hoyt, Robert E. (2000): The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence, in: 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 291-306. 
Bogenrieder, Olav (2005): Die Versicherbarkeit und Kalkulationsgrundlagen von Elementarrisiken in 
Deutschland, Vortrag beim Symposium „Versicherung von Umweltrisiken“ des Kompetenzzent-
rums Versicherungswissenschaften am 24./25.11.2005 in Göttingen.  
Citlak, Banu/ Wagner, Gert G. (2001): Hochwasser: Unkalkulierbare Ereignisse und unvermeidbare 
Folgen? Denkanstöße für den ökonomischen Umgang mit Elementarschäden, in: H.-Ch. Mager, 
H. Schäfer und K. Schrüfer (ed.), Private Versicherung und Soziale Sicherung - Festschrift zum 
60. Geburtstag von Roland Eisen, Marburg, pp. 97-111. 
Coate, Stephen (1995): Altruism, Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy, in: Ameri-
can Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 1, pp. 46-57. 
Endres, Alfred/ Ohl, Cornelia/ Rundshagen, Bettina (2003): Land unter! Ein institutionenökonomi-
scher Zwischenruf, in: List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 284-
294. 
Epstein, Richard (1996): Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risk, in: Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty, Vol. 12, No. 2/3, pp. 287-308. 
Kunreuther, Howard C. (1976): Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, in: Public Policy, Vol. 
2, pp. 227-261. 
Kunreuther, Howard C. (1996): Mitigating Disaster Loss through Insurance, in: Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, Vol. 12, No. 2/3, pp. 171-187. 
Kunreuther, Howard C./ Onculer, A. und Slovic, Paul I. (1998): Time Insensitivity for Protective 
Measures, in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 16, No.3,  pp. 279-99.  
Kunreuther, Howard C. (2000): Strategies for Dealing with Large-Scale and Environmental Risks, in: 
Folmer, H. (ed.), Gabel, L. et al., Frontiers in Environmental Economics. Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, pp. 293-318. 
Noll, Richard G. (1996): The Complex Politics of Catastrophes Economics, in: Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, Vol. 12, No. 2/3, pp. 141-146. 
Palm, Risa/ Hodgson, Michael/ Blanchard, Denise/ Lyons, Donald (1990): Earthquake Insurance in 
California: Environmental Policy and Individual Decision Making, Boulder/Colorado Harper-
collins. 
Pfeil, Jan (2000): Maßnahmen des Katastrophenschutzes und Reaktionen der Bürger in Hochwasser-
gebieten. Am Beispiel von Bonn und Köln, DKKV-Reihe. 
Plapp Tina (2004): Local Experience of Disaster Management and Flood Risk Perception, in: Disas-
ters and Society – From Hazard Assessment to Risk Reduction. Conference Proceedings. D. 
Malzahn / T. Plapp (eds.), Logos Verlag, Berlin, pp. 391-398. 
Prettenthaler, Franz/ Vetters, Nadja (2004): Extreme Wetterereignisse: Nationale Risikoausgleichssys-
teme im Vergleich, InTeReg Working Paper No. 17-2004, Joanneum Research, Graz. 
Schwarze, Reimund (2002),  Environmental Liability and Accident Prevention: Preliminary Experi-
ences in Germany. European Environment. The Journal of European Environmental Policy, 11: 
314-322. 
  18Discussion Paper 620 
References 
Schwarze, Reimund/ Wagner, Gert G. (2002): Hochwasserkatastrophe in Deutschland: Über Soforthil-
fen hinausdenken, in: Wochenbericht DIW Berlin, Vol. 69, pp. 596-600. 
Schwarze, Reimund/ Wagner, Gert G. (2003): Marktkonforme Versicherungspflicht für Naturkatast-
rophen – Bausteine einer zukünftigen Elementarschadenversicherung, in: Wochenbericht DIW 
Berlin, Vol. 70, pp. 183-189. 
Schwarze, Reimund/ Wagner, Gert G. (2004): In the Aftermath of Dresden - New Directions in Ger-
man Flood Insurance, in: Geneva Papers of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 29, pp. 154-169. 
Sinn, Hans-Werner (1995): A Theory of Welfare State, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 97, 
pp. 495-526 
Stoiber, Edmund (1999): Hochwasser Pfingsten 1999, Government Policy Statement by the Minister 
President of Bavaria before the Bavarian State Parliament, 8 June 1999 
Tversky, Amos/ Kahnemann, Daniel (1973): Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, in: Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 5, pp. 207-232. 
Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas von  (2002): Gebäudeversicherung in Europa. Die Grenzen des Wettbe-
werbs, Bern. 
Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas von (2001): Die Vorteile des Staatsmonopols in der Gebäuderversiche-
rung: Erfahrungen aus Deutschland und der Schweiz, in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 31-33. 
Zimmermann, K. W. (1988): Time Preference and Budgetary Decisions, in: Guy Kirsch, Peter Nij-
kamp, Klaus Zimmermann (Hrsg.), The Formulation of Time Preferences in a Multidisciplinary 
Perspective, Aldershot, 205-224.  
  19